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Internal migration plays an important role in moderating regional differences in well-being. This paper analyzes migrants' choice of destination, using Census and Living Standard Surveys data from Nepal. The paper examines how the choice of a migration destination is influenced by income differentials, distance, population density, social proximity, and amenities. The study finds population density and social proximity to have a strong significant effect: migrants move primarily to high population density areas where many people share This paper-a product of the Sustainable Rural and Urban Development Team, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the department to understand the determinants of migration. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at fshilpi@worldbank.org. their language and ethnic background. Better access to amenities is significant as well. Differentials in expected income and consumption expenditures across districts are found to be relatively less important in determining migration destination choice as their effects are smaller in magnitude than those of other determinants. The results of the study suggest that an improvement in amenities (such as the availability of paved roads) at the origin could slow down out-migration substantially.
Introduction
There has been a long tradition of research on migration issues in the development literature (Greenwood 1975 , Borjas 1994 . Recent research has highlighted the methodological issues in estimating returns to migration, in assessing role of migration network in actual migration flows, and in evaluating effect of migration on economic well being. This literature has contributed significantly to the understanding of migration process and its impacts. But, with the exception of some on-going studies, there is little evidence on how migrants choose their destination, particularly in the context of developing countries. 1 This paper seeks to fill this gap in the literature. By focusing on the choice of destination, this research seeks to shed light on the respective role of various locational attributes in the choice of migration destination.
The literature on migrations maintains that differences in income and infrastructure -suitably corrected for price differentials -play a dominant role in the choice of a place to live. To investigate this issue, we develop an original empirical strategy focusing on the choice of destination conditional on the migration decision. This approach offers the advantage of eliminating possible biases resulting from unobserved individual heterogeneity. To allow for network effects, we also correct for correlation in the destination choice of migrants originating from the same location.
The econometric analysis seeks to identify the main factors influencing the choice of migration destination. We limit our analysis to adult males who have migrated outside their birth district for work reasons. We begin by constructing a measure of expected income differentials between the place of origin and all the possible migration destinations. These differentials are allowed to vary depending on observable migrant characteristics believed to affect labor market outcomes, such as education and caste. We also construct measures of social proximity between a migrant's place of birth and each possible destination, using detailed available data on ethnicity, caste, language, and religion.
We also investigate a number of factors that may influence the choice of migration destination but have not received much attention in the existing literature. Fafchamps and Shilpi (2009) have shown that the subjective welfare cost of geographical isolation is high. To investigate this issue, we include regressors controlling for population density and for the average distance to various amenities. Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008) have further shown that migrants are concerned with their welfare relative to that of their birth district as well as to that in their destination location. We examine whether relative welfare considerations influence the choice of migration destination. Additional controls include distance and prices.
The empirical analysis is conducted using LSMS survey data as well as the 2001 population Census data from Nepal. The diverse terrain of Nepal along with geographical variation in amenities makes it ideal for our study. The mountainous nature of Nepal means that the country faces daunting challenges in the provision of transport and energy infrastructure. These challenges are unique to Nepal, however. Similar constraints are faced by many developing countries -or regions within such countries. There are also many non-mountainous countries that nevertheless suffer from serious geographical isolation because of the lack of roads. This applies, for instance, to much of sub-Saharan Africa. Many of the same factors are likely to affect migration patterns in these countries as well.
It has long been observed that migrants often are better educated than non-migrants. 2 Migrants may differ from non-migrants in terms of unobservables as well. A number of recent studies have sought to estimate returns to migration that are immune to selection on unob- 2 A related strand of work points out that migration prospects raise investment in education (de Brauw and Giles, 2006; Batista and Vicente, 2008).
servables (Gabriel and Schmitz,1995; Akee, 2006; and Mckenzie, Gibson and Stillman, 2006) .
Their results suggest that simply comparing the earnings of migrants and non-migrants overestimates the return to migration. For instance, Mckenzie, Gibson and Stillman (2006) use an experimental design to show that ignoring selection bias leads to an overestimation of the gains from migration by 9 to 82 percent. Similar evidence is reported by researchers investigating the relationship between education and migration (Dahl, 2002) . 3 Our empirical strategy sidesteps individual selection issues by controlling for individual fixed effects and by focusing on the choice of destination conditional on migrating, rather than on the decision to migrate itself.
The role of networks in the migration process has also attracted significant recent attention among economists. Carrington et al. (1996) argue that the presence of a large migrant population in the place of destination reduces migration costs and generates path dependence. They use this to explain the Great Black Migration of 1915-1960 in the US. In the same vein, Munshi (2003) investigates the role of interpersonal networks in helping Mexican migrant workers in the US. A similar conclusion is reached by Winters, de Janvry and Sadoulet (2001), also using Mexican migrants to the US, and by Uhlig (2006) for Germany. 4 Network effects also matter at the place of origin. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2005) , for instance, show that strong mutual assistance networks in the place of origin discourages migration. Mora and Taylor (2006) reach similar conclusions.
We do not have data on social networks and therefore cannot control for network effects directly. We therefore seek to control for network effects indirectly. Network effects at the place of destination tend to favor migrants who are better connected with local residents -and therefore may have easier access to jobs, credit, information, etc. To capture such effects, we construct variables that measure social proximity between the migrant and the population mix at the destination. These variables proxy for network effects but also for possible discrimination.
Network effects also generate correlation in migration decisions among individuals originating from the same place. This induces correlation in residuals for migrants having the same districts of origin, and can seriously affect inference. To correct for these effects, we cluster residuals by district of origin.
Results show that population density, social proximity, and access to amenities exert a strong influence on migrants' choice of destination. These results confirm earlier work on the factors affecting the subjective welfare cost of isolation (Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2008) . Differentials in income and consumption expenditures play a less important role than anticipated.
The paper is organized as follows. The conceptual framework and testing strategy are presented in Section 2. The data is discussed in Section 3, together with the main characteristics of the studied population. Econometric results are presented in Section 4. Conclusions follow.
Conceptual framework
Geographical differences in welfare are expected to induce people to relocate. Migrations patterns thus provide valuable evidence regarding income differences -or more generally welfare differences -across space.
Where do these welfare differences come from? A frequent explanation of the migration flow in response to income differences is derived from the Roy's (1951) model of job selection where workers move to the location which provides the highest return to their skill and talent ("unobserved ability") (Gabrial and Schmitz, 1995; Dahl, 2002) . According to the recent economic geography literature (Henderson, 1988; Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999) , agglomeration economies resulting from learning externality and increasing returns cause certain activities to concentrate in a few urban locations which in turn attract workers to those locations. Lucas (2004) recently revisited the issue in the context of low income economies during the post-war period, focusing on the historical issue of rural-urban migration patterns in relation with urbanization. In his analysis, Lucas emphasizes the role of cities as places in which new immigrants can accumulate and earn returns on the skills required by modern production technologies. In this approach, differences in welfare across space are driven by differences in technology -and differences in technology result from agglomeration effects leading certain industries to locate in cities and to take the form of large-scale, modern firms Shilpi, 2003 and .
The predominance of large firms and the emphasis on modern technology would explain why returns to education are higher in cities and why migrants hoping to move there seek to acquire more education (e.g., de Brauw and Giles, 2006).
These observations are the starting point for our work. We are interested in the factors that incite people to move to a specific location. Standard migration models predict that some of these factors have to do with the gain from moving, others have to do with the cost -or riskof moving. More formally, let us assume that individuals derive a different utility from residing in different locations. Let utility of individual h in location i be denoted U h i . The probability of migrating from i to s is expected to increase in the difference between U h s − U h i and to fall with the cost C h is of moving from i to s. Our empirical strategy is to construct estimates of U h s and C h is for all locations to which a migrant h might have relocated within the study country, and to test whether migrants' choice of destination follows U h s − U h i and C h is .
Following the literature, let us assume that utility U h i is a function of the income y h i (or consumption) that the individual can achieve in location i, of the prices p i he or she faces, and a vector of location-specific amenities A i (Bayoh, Irwin and Haab, 2006):
The above linear approximation forms the basis of our empirical estimation. Income y h i in turn depends on observable z h and unobservable μ h characteristics of individual h:
where ε h i is a disturbance independent of z h and μ h . Note that parameters η i and γ i vary across locations. This captures the idea that returns to talent differs with the mix of activities undertaken in that location (Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2005) .
Individuals choose the location that gives them the highest expected utility. Let M h is describe h's choice of destinations: M h is = 1 if individual h migrates from location i to location s, and 0 otherwise. By construction, each individual only migrates to a single location. We have to control for the cost of migrating. If people are credit constrained, or if they are risk averse and there is friction in the circulation of information, they would not want to travel too far. There is also the issue of social interaction with neighbors and friends in the place of destination (for entertainment, mutual support, marriage market, etc.). As recent papers by Munshi (2003) and Beaman (2006) have shown, social networks also play a role in finding employment. Social distance may thus discourage movement.
We therefore assume that the cost of moving from i to s depends on the physical and social distance between i and s (e.g., including differences in religion, language, or caste). Let d h is denote a vector of physical and social distances, where we recognize that social distance depends on characteristics of individual h. We have:
where λ(.) is the logit function. Since we condition on migrating, the dependent variable takes value 1 for one and only one destination. This means that we can only identify the effect of differences between destinations, not the likelihood of migrating itself. This is standard in multiple discrete choice estimation (Train, 2003) .
In practice, we do not observe individual h in two locations at the same time. How can we estimate (2)? We proceed as follows. We begin by estimating equation (1), separately for each location. This yields an estimate of:
for each possible destination. We then use δ s − δ i and ( η s − η i ) z h to estimate equation (2) for migrants only. If income differences drive migration, the coefficients of δ s − δ i and ( η s − η i ) z h should be positive and significant, and they should be equal.
How adequately does this approach take care of unobserved heterogeneity? We begin by noting that, in general E[z h μ h ] = 0: observable and unobservable talents are correlated. For those who wish to estimate the return to a specific individual characteristic z h , this correlation is problematic. For our purpose, this correlation is good news. To see this, consider the extreme case in which μ h is a deterministic function of z h :
Inserting in (1), we get:
In this case the estimated coefficient of z h also captures the effect of unobserved heterogeneity on income: (2) controls for both observed and unobserved heterogeneity.
What happens if z h and μ h are only imperfectly correlated? Say we have:
, we get:
It follows that:
For the above to hold, we need to estimate (1) on all individuals, migrants and non-migrants.
This is not possible, of course, since migrants are not observed in their place of origin. Fortunately, in the studied country, the overwhelming majority of household heads still reside in their birth village, probably because the economic and psychological costs of migrating are high.
This means that the distribution of unobserved talent μ h among district residents corresponds roughly to the distribution of talent in the population at large. This implies that the bias in estimating δ i is probably small when we estimate (1) using data on district residents.
What of equation (2)? It can be rewritten:
which shows that since v h is uncorrelated with z h by construction, ( η s − η i )z h is uncorrelated with the disturbances. The above can thus be used to consistently test whether income differences drive the choice of migration destination.
We have discussed unobserved heterogeneity in income generation. There can also be unobserved heterogeneity in migration costs. We are particularly concerned about the large proportion of surveyed households who still live in their birth district. This population includes households who chose not to migrate, but also many households for whom the cost -or the risk -of migrating were probably too high. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2005) , for instance, have
shown that mutual insurance within castes in India provides a strong disincentive to migrate.
The same probably applies to our study country, which is neighboring India. It follows that the decision not to migrate at all -M h ii = 1 -is distinct from the choice of a destination, conditional on migrating. To minimize the bias that self-selection into migration may generate, we drop M h ii and estimate (3) with migrants only. Since we have no data on individuals who have left the country, our analysis is only pertinent to internal migrants.
Estimation of model (3) is achieved as follows. We begin by generating, for each migrant, N − 1 observations on M h is and the regressors, where N is the number of possible locations. 5 We then estimate (3) by logit. 6 Since the same individual appears N − 1 times, we have to correct for correlation between the different choices for the same individual h. We do so first by adding individual fixed effects. This takes care of much of the correlation. We also correct standard errors for clustering by district of origin. This takes care of possible peer effects, as would arise if individuals from a given location all tend to migrate to the same destination.
Robust standard errors that cluster by district of origin also correct for negative correlation in errors across choices for the same individual, a possibility that fixed effects do not control for.
Negative correlation is a serious issue here, a point that is discussed in more detail in the next section.
We worry about possible circularity resulting from general equilibrium effects (Dahl, to a specific location, such as the capital city, this is likely to affect wages, incomes, and access to amenities in that location. 7 This would generate a potential endogeneity bias due to the fact that incomes and amenities in that location result in part from the decision of many migrants to locate there.
To eliminate this bias, we use past data to estimate the income regression. More precisely, let T be the period for which we have income information and T + t the period at which we 5 The dropped observation corresponds to the location of origin M h ii which, as explained earlier, we do not include in the analysis since including M h ii would mean de facto including the decision of whether to migrate or not.
6 McFadden (1974) has shown that, in multiple choice problems of the kind studied here, the application of logit estimation is justified if (1) the errors in each latent choice equation follow the extreme value distribution and (2) errors are independent across choices. See Train (2003) , Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion. The estimation of models with correlated errors across choices requires either multiple integration or the use of Bayesian estimation techniques relying on Gibbs sampling. With a choice of over 70 possible destinations, multiple integration is out of the question. Gibbs sampling remains a possibility but would require extensive programming. We choose instead to keep the logit approach but to correct the standard errors for possible correlation in errors across choices. In our case the possible efficiency gain achieved by Bayesian methods does not appear to justify the programming cost. 7 The effect could be negative -e.g., congestion -or positive -e.g., agglomeration externalities.
observe migrants. The income regression is estimated using data for period T . Migrants are defined as those who migrated between T and T + t. This implies that migration decision are assumed to be taken based on income differentials at time T , that is, prior to the time at which migrants choose their destination. 8 This appears to be a reasonable assumption given that most migrants in our dataset come from rural areas of Nepal and are unlikely to be particularly good at forecasting differential income trends in multiple locations.
We also examine whether migrants consider relative incomes -rather than absolute incomes -when deciding where to migrate. This point was already touched upon by Stark and Taylor (1) and proceed as outlined above. If migration decisions are based on relative rather than absolute income, then the coefficients of δ s − δ i and ( η s − η i ) z h should be positive and significant only when they are computed using y h i /y i .
In addition to relative and absolute income differences, the analysis also examines the respective roles of various location characteristics such as housing and food prices, availability of public services, and density of human settlement.
The data
Having described the conceptual framework and estimation strategy, we now present the data.
The data used in this paper come from two sources: living standard household surveys, and the population census.
The living standard data come from two rounds of Nepal Living Standards Survey (NLSS).
The Because our focus is on work migration, we restrict our attention to adult males. Among those, 16,850 are recorded as having moved in the five years preceding the census specifically for work reasons. These individuals are the focus of our analysis. We note that, by construction, this approach excludes those who have migrated outside Nepal. Our focus is thus on internal migrants. We do not have data on India but since there is no big Indian city within 200 km of Nepalese border, commuting to India for work while residing in a Nepalese district is rare, making it unlikely that economic opportunities in neighboring India affected the choice of migration destination within Nepal.
Figures 1 and 2 show the geographical distribution of work migrants in terms of district of residence and origin. Districts with a high concentration of work migrants relative to nonmigrant adult males appear in red, those with a low concentration appear in blue. We see that a small number of destination districts have a high proportion of work migrants. In contrast, districts of origin are distributed widely across the country. This reflects the fact that much work migration is from remote rural areas to towns and cities.
The main characteristics of work migrants are reported in Table 1 , together with those of nonmigrant adult males. We see that work migrants are on average younger and better educated.
The census contains detailed information about ethnicity, language, and religion. In the Nepal census, the term 'ethnicity' is used to capture a hodgepodge of caste and tribal distinctions.
The census distinguishes up to 103 ethnic categories. Most of these categories only account for a tiny proportion of the total population. In terms of the total adult population, the most common ethnic categories are Chhetri, Brahmin, and Newar who, together, account for 35% of adult males in the 11% census. All three categories are regarded as upper castes. As we see from Table 1 , migrants are much more likely to be upper caste than non-migrants.
The census distinguishes 84 different languages. The main ones are Nepali and Maithili, spoken by 58% of the population. In Table 1 we see that work migrants are much more likely to speak Nepali, the main language in the country. While the Nepalese population is heterogeneous in terms of ethnicity and language, it is relatively homogeneous in terms of religion: 81% of adult males are Hindu and 11% are Buddhist. We see in Table 1 Using the NLSS data we begin by estimating a regression of the form: not included because they are possibly affected by migration. 9 In contrast, age, education, and caste status can be regarded as exogenous to the migration decisions of adult males. Equation (4) is estimated using correct sampling weights. 10 Regression estimates for equation (4) are summarized in Table 2 where we show α as well as the average and standard error of δ s , β s and χ s . The coefficients δ i and η i are large and jointly significant. There is considerable variation across districts not only in average log income and consumption but also in the income or consumption premia associated with education and high caste. These results are used to construct, for each of the 16,000 or so work migrants in the census, a measure of the income or consumption they can expect to achieve in each of the possible destination districts. Formally, this measure is calculated as: The same methodology is used to construct other variables that may affect the choice of 9 The literature has often emphasized that migrations often serve an important role in household formation. For migrants, the prospect of forming a large, successful household is likely to be one of the purposes of migration.
1 0 The 1995/96 NLSS survey adopted the following sampling strategy. Within each district a small number of wards were selected at random. Within each ward, 12 randomly selected households were interviewed. Because the wards differ widely in terms of population, applying sampling weights is essential in order to obtain consistent estimates of δs.
destination. Building on a growing literature documenting the relationship between subjective welfare and relative income, Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008) show that Nepalese households care about their consumption level relative to that of others in the same location. If this is the case, it is conceivable that migrants choose their destination not so much for the absolute gain in income it may provide but for the gain in relative status that would ensue. For instance, if returns to education and ability are higher in an urban setting, an educated individual may improve his relative position in society by moving from a rural to an urban setting. To investigate this possibility, we estimate equation (4) using the log of relative income (or relative consumption) as dependent variable and construct a predicted relative income measure using the same formula (5) . These are shown in the second panel of Table 1 .
Theories of work migration predict that individuals move to increase their utility or welfare.
The 1995/96 NLSS asked respondents a number of questions regarding their subjective satisfaction level with various dimensions of consumption -namely, food, clothing, housing, health care, and child schooling. They were also asked their subjective satisfaction with their level of total income. We apply the same methodology to these data -i.e., we estimate a regression of the same form as (4) and apply formula (5) to construct an expected subjective satisfaction index. If migrants correctly anticipate the subjective satisfaction they will enjoy from moving to different destinations, these subjective satisfaction measures may offer a better way of controlling for expected welfare differences across destinations.
To control for migration costs, we construct variables proxying for geographical and social distance. For geographical distance between districts, we use the arc distance between the district of origin and each possible district of destination, computed from the longitude and latitude of each districts' administrative center. We expect the cost and risk of migration to increase with physical distance. We seek to control for price differences across locations. This is difficult because we do not have detailed price data. We are mostly concerned about housing costs and prices of common household goods.
We use the price of rice as a proxy for the price of common household goods. This is not entirely satisfactory but in the absence of a district-level consumer price index this is the best we can do. Given the mountainous nature of the country, rice cannot be grown in many parts of the country. to obtain estimates of a s , the housing cost premium in each district s. Regression results are shown in Table A1 in appendix. Many house characteristics are significant with the expected sign, e.g., larger, better built houses with better in-house amenities are worth more. District price differentials are large and jointly significant. Since the dependent variable is in log form, a s measures the housing cost premium in each district.
To the extent that people are mobile, housing price differentials capture, in a reduced form, the effect of location attributes such as proximity to jobs and access to public amenities. It is therefore possible for migrants to be attracted by districts which command a high housing price premium. To further control for access to amenities, we include travel time to the nearest road (a measure of market access) and to the nearest bank (a measure of financial and commercial development).
We include a number of regressors to control for geographical isolation. Fafchamps and Shilpi (2009) have shown that, in Nepal, subjective welfare is negatively associated with geographical isolation. Census data on total population and population density in each district are used as proxies for urbanization and geographical proximity: the denser the population, the less geographically isolated individuals are likely to be. We also include data on the average elevation in each district. Nepal being a mountainous country, the higher the average elevation of a district, the more costly it is to build roads, raising transport and delivery costs to the district. Ceteris paribus, we expect migrants to seek out districts with a higher population density and a lower elevation.
4 Econometric results
Univariate analysis
We now investigate the choice of migration destination. We begin with simple univariate analysis.
Variables are of the form ∆ h is = x h s −x h i where i is the district of origin of migrant h and s is each of 74 possible districts of destination. We examine the average value of ∆ h is for the destination district and compare it to the value of ∆ h is for alternative destinations. For instance, let x h s be population density in district s. The average value of ∆ h is for the actual destination of the migrant tells us whether the destination district is more densely populated than the district of origin. The comparison between ∆ h is for actual and hypothetical destinations tells us whether the actual district of destination is more densely populated than alternative destinations.
Results are presented in Table 3 for all variables used in the analysis. We begin with district log income δ s . We have two estimates of δ s , one obtained using reported income data, and the other based on reported consumption data. Given that most respondents to the NLSS survey are self-employed, measurement error is typically larger for income than for consumption. We see that our estimates of log income and consumption δ s are on average 20% and 8% higher in the district of destination than in the district of origin, respectively. Migrating to one of the 73 alternative destinations would, on average, have reduced income and consumption relative to the district of origin. The difference in anticipated income and consumption between actual and hypothetical destinations is strongly significant. Migrants thus tend to move to districts where consumption and income are higher.
Next we examine whether there are significant differences in returns to individual characteristics η s z h . Surprisingly, results for income show that η s z h is on average lower in the district of destination than in the district of origin. The difference is large enough to be statistically significant. This implies that better educated, high caste migrants are expected to gain relatively less from migrating to actual destination districts than less educated, lower caste migrants. In contrast, η s z h estimates based on consumption data show an increase relative to the district of origin. This suggests that better educated, high class migrants would gain more from migrating.
We also observe a slightly stronger increase for the actual destination than in the alternatives.
The difference is not statistically significant, however.
Differences in relative log income and consumption are displayed next. Predicted relative log income and consumption are generated using the same formula δ s + β s (E h s − E s ) + χ s (H h s − H s ) used for log income, except that, by construction, δ s = 0 always. We see that relative income falls between the district of origin and the district of destination while it would have risen in alternative destinations. The difference is statistically significant. In contrast, relative consumption is higher in the destination district than in the district of origin or in alternative destinations but the difference between actual and hypothetical destinations is not significant.
We then turn to differences in subjective welfare. The equivalent of δ s is used as for log income. We begin with subjective perceptions regarding the adequacy of total income. Relative to their district of origin, the average subjective satisfaction with total income is found to rise between the district of origin and the district of destination. Whether this is fully anticipated by migrants is unclear. Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008) show that in assessing their subjective satisfaction migrants still compare themselves to those in their district of origin.
Results regarding subjective satisfaction from the consumption of food, clothing, housing, health care, and schooling are shown next. We see that in all cases the district of destination has a much larger level of subjective satisfaction, both relative to the district of origin and relative to other possible destinations. We also compute the equivalent of η s z h and find it to be negative in five out of six cases. This is consistent with the fall in returns to education and high caste that was found for income between the districts of origin and destination.
We then turn to prices and amenities. We observe on average an 9% fall in the median price of rice between the districts of origin and destination. Migrating to alternative destinations would have raised the price of rice instead of reducing it. This is consistent with our interpretation that the price of rice in part captures differences in delivery costs driven by isolation. In contrast,
we find a 38% average increase in the rental cost of housing between the districts of origin and destination. Moving to an alternative destination would also have raised average housing costs but by less than that in the actual destination district. Travel time to various facilities and infrastructures falls uniformly between the district of origin and that of destination. Since these differences are strongly correlated with each other, we only report two: travel time to the nearest road, and travel time to the nearest bank. Both fall massively between district of origin and destination, and both would have risen had the migrant moved to an alternative destination.
We observe a strong negative difference in elevation between the district of origin and district of destination. Moving to an alternative destination would, on average, have resulted in a higher elevation than the district of origin. This implies that migrants on average move down from the mountains. They also tend to go to districts with a larger and more dense population than the district of origin and alternative destinations. Migration is thus primarily from rural to urban areas.
In terms of social proximity, we see that migrants on average face a population that is more different from them in terms of both language and caste/ethnicity than it would be in their district of origin. This is true for the actual destination district but also for alternative districts. We do not observe the same pattern for religion; if anything, migrants are more likely to face someone of their religion in their district of destination. The difference is small, however.
Finally, the geographical distance between the district of origin and the actual destination is on average smaller than that between the district of origin and alternative destinations: if anything, migrants tend to go to a district that is closer. The difference is statistically significant but it is not large, however.
To summarize, simple bivariate analysis shows that migrants tend to move to a district with: a larger population and population density; a lower elevation and closer proximity to the district of origin; a higher average income and consumption; higher subjective consumption adequacy; lower rice prices and higher housing costs; better access to public amenities. In contrast, migrants move to districts where they have a lower relative income compared to their district of origin. They also tend to move to districts where fewer people speak their language or share their religion.
Multivariate analysis
We have seen that there are strong differences between actual and alternative migration destinations. Many of these characteristics are correlated with each other, however. To disentangle them we turn to multivariate analysis and estimate the migration regression (3). As explained in the previous section, regressors include: prices as described above; geographical and social dis-tance; and access to amenities. We also include the log of total population, population density, and average elevation as additional controls.
We begin by estimating (3) with δ s − δ i computed from the log income data. Results are shown in the first column of Table 4 . As discussed earlier, reported results include individual fixed effects and standard errors clustered by district of origin. The univariate analysis showed that income was significant on its own. Once we control for distance, population, prices and amenities, however, the difference in expected income is no longer significant. Most of other variables are, though. Distance has the expected negative sign -on average the migration destination is closer to the district of origin than alternative destinations. The destination district also has a significantly larger population and population density, a lower elevation, and a lower rice price. Housing costs in contrast are higher in the destination district than in alternative destinations, possibly because they control for the availability of amenities and other public goods. We also see that the destination district has a significantly shorter average travel time to the nearest road. Once we control for road distance, travel time to the nearest bank is no longer significant.
The univariate analysis showed that migrants on average move to destinations where they are on average less likely to find people like them. The results presented in Table 4 present a different picture. Conditional on the other regressors, the ethnicity and language proximity indices are significant with the anticipated sign: social proximity between the migrant and the population of the destination district is higher than in alternative destinations. The religion proximity index is not significant. Taken together, these results suggest that, conditional on material benefits from migration, migrants prefer to move to a destination where they integrate more easily -and possibly enjoy network benefits in terms of access to jobs and housing (Munshi
2003, Beaman 2006).
It is surprising that income differences are not significant once we control for geography, population, prices and amenities. This may be because we have not included individual-specific income differentials across districts. We therefore reestimate (3) with ( η s − η i ) z h as well as δ s − δ i . Results are shown in column 2 of Table 4 . They remain non-significant. In column 3 we replace absolute differences in log income with relative differences. The constructed regressor, which by construction depends only on ( η s − η i ) z h , remains non-significant. Finally in column 4 we compute δ s − δ i and ( η s − η i ) z h using answers to the question regarding the subjective adequacy of total income. Estimate coefficients are significant, but with opposite signs: only the ( η s − η i ) z h part as the anticipated positive sign.
It is conceivable that these surprising and disappointing results are driven by measurement error in income. It is indeed well known that income is notoriously difficult to measure in poor, primarily self-employed populations. To investigate this possibility, we reestimate (3) using NLSS consumption data to construct δ s − δ i and ( η s − η i ) z h .
Results, shown in Table 5 , are more in line with expectations. Although average log consumption in the district is not significant, the coefficient of the ( η s − η i ) z h is strongly significant, and so is the coefficient of the combined δ s − δ i + ( η s − η i ) z h variable. We also find a significant positive coefficient when the combined δ s − δ i + ( η s − η i ) z h variable is constructed using relative rather than absolute log consumption. If we include δ s − δ i + ( η s − η i ) z h computed both from absolute and relative income, neither of them is significant, probably because they are too strongly correlated. We cannot therefore discern whether it is absolute or relative standards of living that affect the choice of migration destination.
We also estimate similar regressions using subjective consumption adequacy questions to construct δ s − δ i and ( η s − η i ) z h . Results, not shown here to save space, are generally nonsignificant. The only exception is food consumption but, as we found in column 4 of Table 4 , estimated coefficients have opposite signs so the results are difficult to interpret.
Robustness checks
We conduct numerous robustness checks. We first try to understand the contradiction between the univariate and multivariate results. To this effect, we estimate a series of simple regressions Next, we investigate in different ways whether our failure to find a significant income effect in Tables 4 and 5 is due to income mismeasurement. The income regression (4) does not control for household size and composition. The rationale for doing so is that (1) household size and composition may be endogenous to the migration decision -e.g., individuals who migrate to the city may opt to have a smaller household -and that (2) migrants may derive satisfaction from the total income jointly earned by the household they head. However, not correcting for household size and composition a higher predicted income E[y h s |z h ] in districts where households are larger and there are more work opportunities for household dependents -typically rural districts. To investigate whether this is responsible for the low income coefficients, we include the log of household size and the share of adult males and females in the income regression (4) and we replicate the analysis using the revised E[y h s |z h ]. The results, which are not shown here to save space, are virtually undistinguishable of those reported in Tables 4 and 5 .
Central to our estimation are estimates of income and consumption levels enjoyed by households in various districts. To check the robustness of our results, we reestimate all income and consumption regressions (4) using non-migrants only. The reason for doing so is that non- This strategy does not control for possible self-selection: if more talented individuals migrate, remaining households may be less productive. As a result, they may earn less than migrants in the same location. To correct for the self-selection of non-migrants we need variables that affect the decision to migrate but are unlikely to affect income. Family background variables such as the education and occupation of the father may serve this purpose because they affect the ability of the migrant's father to help finance the cost of migration. Given that most migrants migrate early in their adult life, it is reasonable to expect that parental influences play a role in the decision to migrate -and in the financing of migration costs. We use the education and occupation of the father to construct two selection correction terms for the income regressions -one selection term for migrants, and one for non-migrants (Wooldridge, p. 631):
where φ(z θ) and Φ(z θ) are the normal density function and cumulative distribution from the selection regression of migrant status m on determinants z.
The selection regression is shown in Table A2 in Appendix. Other variables are the same as those appearing in the income and consumption regressions (4) . We see that family background variables are significant. Using this selection regression we construct the two Mills ratio shown in equation (6), one for migrants and one for non-migrants, and we reestimate the income and consumption regressions with these additional regressors, obtain corrected δ s and η s estimates, and reestimate the destination choice regressions. Results are nearly indistinguishable from those reported in Tables 4 and 5 . They are omitted here to save space.
When constructing E[y h s |z h ] we implicitly assume that migrants are well informed about incomes in all potential destinations. But it is possible that they are better informed about certain destinations, for instance, destinations chosen by migrants from their district in the past.
Failing to control for this possibility may lead to an attenuation bias in the income coefficient.
To investigate this possibility, we interacted the income variable with a proxy for the availability of income information. If migrants only respond to income differences for those districts on which they have more accurate information, the coefficient of the interacted term should be significant even if the uninteracted term is not. As proxy for the availability of information, we use the number of adult males who migrated more than 5 years ago (that is before the migrants themselves) from the district of origin to each of the districts of destination. The coefficient of the interacted term is minuscule in magnitude and uniformly non-significant. The same finding obtains whether we use all migrants or only work migrants.
As a final robustness check, we reestimate the model using migrant data from the NLSS 2002/03. The number of migrants is significantly smaller, so results may be less precise. The advantage of this approach is that it serves as cross-validation. Results are presented in Tables   6 and 7 . Table 6 should be compared with Table 4 , and Table 7 with Table 5 .
Comparing Tables 6 and 4 , we again find that anticipated income, whether absolute or relative, is either non-significant or negative. Most of our other results obtain. Exceptions include the rice price -which appears with the wrong sign but is only marginally significant -and elevation and population density -which are no longer significant. Comparing Tables 7 and 5, we find that in the smaller NLSS 2002/3 dataset none of the anticipated consumption variables is statistically significant. Other results are as before.
Magnitude
To assess the relative magnitude of our results, we multiply coefficients estimated in Tables 4   and 5 by the standard deviation of their respective regressors. We then average over the various regressions reported in Tables 4 and 5 . Calculations are summarized in Table 8 . The larger the value, the more influence the regressor has on the choice of a destination district.
We see that the most important regressors in terms of magnitude are travel time to the nearest road, elevation, language similarity, and the price of rice. Consumption variables have an effect on migration destination that is smaller in magnitude: a one standard deviation increase in anticipated relative consumption, for instance, has an effect on destination that corresponds to a third of the effect of a one standard deviation in elevation -and one-sixth of a one standard deviation in distance from the nearest road. Income variables have a negligible effect on migration decisions. These calculations confirm our earlier assessment.
Conclusion
Combining data from a household survey and an 11% census of the population, we have estimated destination choice regressions for Nepalese internal migrants. Results show that population density, social proximity, and access to amenities exert a strong influence on migrants' choice of destination. These results confirm earlier work on the factors affecting the subjective welfare cost of isolation (Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2008 It is difficult to draw causal inference from observational data. This study is no exception.
The results presented here are nevertheless sufficiently suggestive to cast doubt on the theory that the choice of migration destination is driven primarily by income differentials. Other factors seem to play a strong -and probably more important -role. 
